The Schizophrenic Solution:
Dialectics of Neurosis and Anti-psychiatric
Animus in Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man
J. BRADFORD CAMPBELL
Of the many roles St. Philip’s Episcopal Church has played in Harlem’s modern history,
perhaps none is as remarkable as or more improbable than its tenure as the home of the
LaFargue Psychiatric Clinic. From 1946 to 1959, the clinic operated literally underground in
the basement of St. Philip’s parish house, catering to Harlem’s racial and economic
minorities and offering, in the words of its founder, “the will to survive in a hostile world”
(“Psychiatry” 50). On Tuesday and Thursday nights, from six to eight in the evening (though
the all-volunteer workforce almost always stayed later),1 Harlem’s residents would descend
into a realm described by Ralph Ellison as a “labyrinth” (Shadow 47) of stairways and
hallways to receive treatments and therapies unavailable to them anywhere else. The scene
must have been a strange one: outside, a line of the most unlikely candidates for
psychotherapy waited for a chance to speak with doctors whose time was more often
reserved for the privileged white folk who could pay them; inside, a makeshift waiting
room was cobbled together from Sunday school chairs and tables, and the skeleton of a
clinic took shape from a row of cubicles stretching the length of a hallway.
Perhaps the only thing more incongruous than the apparatus of psychiatry in the bowels
of a church would have been the very existence of a psychiatric clinic in the heart of
Harlem, where, following the social logic of the day, there would hardly have been a need
for it. For while the inescapably poor and largely African American clientele could and, in
accordance with the era’s familiar social prejudices, likely would suffer from a kind of
vulgar insanity,2 psychotherapies of the sort that Dr. Fredric Wertham and his staff sought
to provide were considered applicable only to the civilized and sophisticated (read: white
and rich) patients who struggled with the more refined neuroses of modernity.3
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According the clinic’s first brochure and other early announcements of its existence, services were
originally provided on Tuesday and Friday evenings (see The LaFargue Clinic and “LaFargue Clinic
Gives Harlem”). A Tuesday and Thursday schedule was later adopted, and as the clinic evolved and
gained more volunteers and funding (it was chronically short of both), the Thursday hours were
eventually extended to 4:30–8:00, though the staff had long been accustomed to working overtime (see
Mosse; “LaFargue Clinic Organization”; “Untitled”).
Indeed, a newspaper article appearing shortly after the opening of the clinic and discussing the barring
of African Americans from mental hospitals ran with the following subtitle: “Psychiatrists Aver: ‘They’re
Crazy Anyway!’” (Curtis 1).
For a more thorough examination of the origins and features of this collaboration between racial and
psychiatric politics, see Campbell.
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The LaFargue Clinic was thus a thorough anomaly—the first and, in its own time, the
only clinic of its kind, a testament to the urgent need for psychiatric services in Harlem
and a sign of the utter absence of them. To exist at all, the LaFargue Clinic, like Ellison’s
own invisible man, had to go underground; ever since it closed its doors in 1959, it has
remained, like Brother Tod Clifton, curiously outside history. I draw attention to it here,
though, not simply to plug a historical hole or to recover a forgotten institutional pioneer
but to consider the implications of its singular position at the intersection of the histories of
literature and psychiatry. For while Wertham helmed and provided a public face for the
clinic, it was cofounded by Richard Wright and was supported to varying degrees by a
who’swho of literary icons, including Langston Hughes and Ralph Ellison. Indeed, it is
Ellison’s 1948 essay on the clinic, “Harlem Is Nowhere,” that is largely responsible for its
remaining in our memory at all, and we can well imagine what his particular interest in
LaFargue might have been. For Ellison, Wright, and others, the clinic was a sorely needed
antidote to the psychic crises produced by daily life in Harlem, a city awash in what Wertham
called a “free-floating hostility” and the embodiment of what Ellison and Wright viewed as the
nation’s betrayal of its democratic promises (qtd. in Eversley 446).4 But their broader interest
in psychiatry—of which their involvement with the clinic was a sign and a part—
manifests itself at a crucial moment in American cultural history, one in which certain
psychiatric definitions of subjectivity were becoming increasingly imbricated in debates over
American national identity.
It is precisely at this moment, Shelly Eversley argues, that the work of these writers
“enact[s] a historical turn toward psychology” (447). While I disagree that we witness
here the advent of self-conscious black literary engagement with psychiatry, I do think that
the relationship between these writers and the clinic offers promising ground and a certain
imperative for a fruitful investigation of the broader relationship between literature and
psychiatry.
Especially where African American literature is concerned, there has been a general
reluctance to approach these categories together or to consider the debts and the
contributions that each makes to the other. Two notable exceptions are Claudia Tate’s
pathbreaking Psychoanalysis and Black Novels (1998) and Anne Anlin Cheng’s more recent
landmark, The Melancholy of Race (2001), which includes a chapter on Ralph Ellison .5
Each of these studies deftly deploys a psychoanalytic framework to interrogate and elucidate
the contours and crises of modern African American subjectivity, but neither proposes to
examine how mental illness itself is
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As Shelly Eversley explains, this betrayal was made all the more immediate for Wright and Ellison by
the postwar push to see America as an “exemplary democracy.” The nation’s future as a proverbial
beacon for a new democratic world was jeopardized by its commitment to segregationist policy—a
profoundly “unresolved tension” that produced a metaphorical schizophrenia for white Americans (447).
We might also include here, more broadly, Frantz Fanon’s seminal work The Wretched of the Earth, the
final chapter of which—titled “Colonial War and Mental Disorders”—lays important groundwork for
understanding forms of racial oppression as “purveyor[s]” of mental distress (181).
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represented in African American literature or how those representations might be implicated in
the broader history of psychiatry, of which psychoanalysis (as a clinical and literary-critical
practice) is a part. As Mark Micale, Roy Porter, and other historians of psychiatry observe,
there are significant lacunae in our narrative of how modern literature engages with
twentieth-century models of the mind—a dearth of scholarship that works to understand
the nature of aesthetic exchanges with the heterogeneous, polyphonic discourses of
psychiatry.6 This essay seeks at least in part to redress this oversight.
It is indeed remarkable that a novel like Invisible Man, with its consistent and conspicuous
attention to a range of mental illnesses, has for so long elicited so little critical commentary on
this point. As Caffilene Allen notes in her study of the significance of Sigmund Freud’s Totem
and Taboo in the novel, “While Ellison’s multidimensional Invisible Man has attracted a great
deal of critical attention, not much of it has been psychological” (1). Indeed, though
numerous critics make passing reference to Ellison’s indebtedness to Freud or the “madcap
comedy” of the scene at the Golden Day bar and brothel, none pauses to consider the larger
implications of and relationship between representations of neuroses in the text
(McSweeney 54). 7 With the exception of Eversley’s work, those studies committed to what
Allen calls the psychological features of the novel are largely dated and generally problematic. Selma Fraiberg’s and Ellin Horowitz’s Freudian analyses of the text date from the
early 1960s; while some credence has been given to the former, the latter has been branded
“too broad to be helpful,” producing “confusion, superficiality, forced parallels, undeveloped
points and inconsistency” (Covo 32).
Yet even a relatively more recent study like Allen’s is itself ultimately unsatisfying.
Though her article claims to be an investigation of the significance of Freud’s Totem and
Taboo in the novel, it is more accurately an attempt to use Freud’s clinical theory as a
hermeneutic device. In her attempt to “analyz[e] the events in Invisible Man from Freud’s
theory developed in Totem and Taboo” (3), Allen does not consider how Ellison employs and
negotiates the concepts of Freud’s treatise in Invisible Man but rather assumes without
question the treatise’s validity and appropriateness as an interpretive model. As I later
suggest, however, a closer examination of how this novel represents neurosis reveals a
radically anti-psychiatric impetus that suspects rather than supports Freud’s work in Totem
and Taboo and challenges many of the larger tenets of psychoanalysis and psychiatry.
The apparent paucity of critical interest in the psychiatric features of the novel may be
symptomatic of a more general silence in African American literary criticism when it comes
to issues of psychology. As Tate observes, there has long been a “general absence of
psychoanalytic models in black intellectual discourse,” which can largely be attributed to a
venerable critical tradition that has been hesitant, if not entirely unwilling, to tolerate
artistic or critical work that focuses too exclusively “on the inner worlds of black
characters” (Psychoanalysis 4–5). She recalls
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See Micale 7. For an introduction to the field of the history of psychiatry, see Roy Porter and Mark
Micale’s Discovering the History of Psychiatry.
For further examples of the casual treatments of neurosis I discuss here, see Phillip Brian Harper (“To
Become”) and Robert Butler (“The City”).

3

Granville Hicks’s claim in a review of Wright’s The Outsider that the protagonist is “not so
much a Negro . . . as a ‘psychological man’”—as if the two could not possibly go together
(qtd. in Tate 4). Underlying all this is the familiar but mistaken assumption that the
psychological is somehow not social and, if not social, then certainly not implicated in or
useful to projects devoted to “black liberation” (5). Indeed, some fear that psychological
investigations may even be “detrimental to black agency,” and history suggests that such
fears rest upon solid ground (16). One thinks, for example, of how psychology and
psychiatry were put into the service of World War I−era “intelligence” testing that, under the
aegis of an objective exam designed by “eminent psychologists,” sought to establish the
mental inferiority and civic unfitness of African Americans (Long 22).8 It is perhaps because
of fears that such history may be repeated that we witness not only the relative rarity of
psychoanalytical models that Tate observes, but a more general lack of critical interest in the
ways African American literature engages with the discourses of psychiatry.
All the same, it seems prudent to recognize and remain conscious of the many missteps the
study of this engagement might make. As Donald B. Gibson observes, there is a risk in
psychological studies of race of reading African Americans as necessarily pathological and
biologically destined to suffer. He cites Abram Kardiner and Lionel Ovesey’s treatise The
Mark of Oppression (1962) as an example: “The Negro, in contrast to the white, is a
more unhappy person . . . he suffers more. . . . There are no exceptions to this rule. The
final result is a wretched internal life” (qtd. in Gibson 41). The problem here, of course, is
that such conceptions reduce African Americans to “walking instance[s] of pathology” (Gibson
41). While Gibson does not deny that there may be a relationship between race and neurosis,
he does insist that we at least allow black neurotics the possibility of agency and admit
room for the negotiation of psychic stress. This is precisely the stance Ellison adopts in
Invisible Man as he attempts to make space for the critical examination of psychiatry in
literature.
In the pages that follow, I offer a first step toward illuminating the dynamics of this
relationship by reading Ellison’s epic Invisible Man as a seminal meeting of the aesthetic
with the psychiatric. I propose that throughout the novel, Ellison embraces a dialectical
understanding of neurosis that figures it as both disabling and enabling and deploys it as a
claim to modernity and a rejection of and retreat from the modern world. The text is
prescient in its postmodern playfulness, offering a representation of mental illness
detached from its specifically psychiatric or broadly medical moorings that anticipates by
more than a decade the radical revisions of Michel Foucault and Thomas Szasz. Yet however
playful it may seem, Ellison could hardly be called amused. Committed as he was
personally to the goals of the LaFargue Clinic, Invisible Man falls far short of the
endorsement or celebration of psychiatry we might expect it to be. Instead the text
approaches psychiatry and those who practice it as obstacles to rather than agents of social
progress. Deeply suspicious of and subtly hostile toward the larger medical establishment’s
interest in black minds and bodies, the novel is preoccupied with the
8
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meanings and possibilities of black neuroses at the same time as it is marked by an antipsychiatric animus that prefigures the revolution the field of psychiatry would witness in
the decades after the novel was published.
The Primitivist Logic of Twentieth-Century Psychiatry
Of course, no textual representation of mental illness or literary engagement with psychiatry is
entirely self-contained. Rather, it is inevitably and in staggeringly intricate ways
connected to the various discourses—popular, scientific, medical, and otherwise—that
seek to condition what mental illness means, to whom it applies, and to whom it belongs.
If we are to do anything more than observe as simply interesting or record as merely
promising the figures of neurosis we find in a text like Ellison’s, we must situate them
within the formidably dense and historically specific web of discourses in which they are
imbricated. None of these discourses seems more important—none played so crucial a role
in underwriting the most widely accepted and circulated understanding of neuroses—
than the oft-invoked and profoundly vexed discourse of primitivism.
In the decades since Marianna Torgovnick published her definitive study of primitivism
in Gone Primitive (1990), it has become a critical commonplace to understand this
discourse as culturally and historically specific (Torgovnick 14). As Tracy McCabe puts
it, primitivism, far from monolithic, cannot be “simply labeled as either subversive or
supportive of dominant ideology” (475). Rather, it “should be read as a local practice or event
that takes on diverse and often contradictory meanings in its various social, historical, and
literary contexts” (475). The particular context I am interested in here is one in which the
discourse of primitivism intersects with the discipline of psychiatry in the era of Invisible
Man. More specifically, I want to illuminate the ways that primitivist assumptions and
prejudices worked to create a specific understanding of mental illness that posited blacks as
“primitive” and therefore free (and, moreover, incapable) of the supposedly refined and
civilized neuroses of modernity.
As Ann duCille observes, in the first half of the twentieth century African Americans
were often perceived and portrayed as “a panacea for an overindustrialized society dying
from an acute case of modernity” —a free, libidinal people whose “untrammeled sexuality”
kept them “shielded from neuroses” (73).9 What she alludes to here, of course, is the tired
myth of the “happy darky” and the attendant notion that blacks, far from potentially
neurotic themselves, could actually serve as a remedy for white neurosis. Ellison brings a
version of this attitude to life in Invisible Man in the form of young Emerson, the
melancholy white son of an entrepreneur who, while he claims to “want to help” the
invisible man (Invisible 187), seems more interested in how the invisible man can help him.
As several critics have suggested,10 Emerson sees in the narrator an opportunity to gain his
9

Ellison himself notes with disdain this “misjudg[ment]” of “Negro passion,” which posits the Negro as the
“idealized . . . symbol of sensation, of unhampered social and sexual relationships” (Shadow 86).
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See, for example, Daniel Y. Kim 320.
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own sexual freedom and, we might add, to remedy the “neurosis” he implies he has when
he refers to a “difficult session with [his] analyst” (185).
Ellison, in fact, seems keenly sensitive to and aware of the assumptions and stereotypes of
primitivism in the novel. They operate, for instance, at the first Brotherhood function the
narrator attends when a drunken guest asks him to sing “one of those real good ole Negro
work songs” and insists that “all colored people sing” (312). They’re apparent, too, in Sybil’s
“revolting” request for a savage sexual experience with “Brother Taboo” (517). The
Trueblood scene demonstrates just how far white society will go to enforce these myths:
“The nigguhs up at the school come down to chase me off,” but the whites “[told] me not to
worry, that they was going to send word up to the school that I was to stay right where I
am. . . . The white folks took up for me. And the white folks took to coming out here to see
us and talk with us . . . and wrote it all down in a book” (67, 53). This passage records the
very process of making the primitive discursive. After rewarding Trueblood for
confirming their expectations (and acting out their own deepest desires), the “white folks”
record it all in a book that will no doubt disseminate and perpetuate a familiar primitivist
logic.
This is precisely the sort of work that was accomplished by various scientific texts such
as Robert Park and E. W. Burgess’s 1921 Introduction to the Science of Sociology—a text that
Ellison not only read but by which he was profoundly provoked. A passage like this one is
typical of the discourse:
The temperament of the Negro, as I conceive it, consists in a few elementary but
distinctive characteristics, determined by physical organizations and transmitted
biologically. These characteristics manifest themselves in a genial, sunny, and social
disposition, in an interest and attachment to external physical things rather than to
subjective states and objects of introspection. . . . The Negro is, by natural disposition, neither an intellectual nor an idealist, like the Jew; nor a brooding introspective,
like the East Indian. . . . He is primarily an artist, loving life for its own sake. (qtd.
in Kim 310)
The keywords of primitivist discourse that codified blacks as happy primitives emerge in
Park and Burgess’s portrait of blacks as “sunny,” “social,” life-loving “artist[s].” Perhaps
more telling, though, is the way this passage works to deny blacks any sort of interiority.
They are, it is claimed, inherently incapable of “introspection” and naturally immune to
“subjective states.” In short, they are fundamentally, “biologically” invulnerable to
neurosis.11
Even venerable psychological treatises like Freud’s Totem and Taboo, with its subtitled
claim to delineate “some points of agreement between the mental lives of
11

That such notions were thoroughly embedded in the culture and could be reproduced by even the most
unlikely sources is apparent when we consider that Park was widely regarded as an icon of progressive
racial politics and was intimately involved with the efforts of Booker T. Washington and the Tuskegee
Institute. Even Ellison admitted that “American Negroes have benefited greatly” as a result of his work,
though according to Kim, Ellison severely condemned the view of blacks offered by Park in the text cited
above (311). Also see St. Clair Drake.
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savages and neurotics” (the very construction of the subtitle suggesting that the primitive
cannot be neurotic), only end up reiterating by implication this artificial division between
nonwhite races and neurosis. It is a remarkably conflicted text that in some instances seems
to disrupt the distinction between “primitive” and “civilized” and in others seems only to
reinforce it along with the primitivist stereotypes it produces. For instance, early in the
treatise Freud writes:
It may begin to dawn on us that the taboos of the savage Polynesians are after all

not so remote from us as we were inclined to think at first, that the moral and conventional prohibitions by which we ourselves are governed may have some essential

relationship with these primitive taboos and that an explanation of taboo might
throw a light upon the obscure origin of our own “categorical imperative.” (22)
Even while he continues to employ the we-they dichotomy, Freud works here to deconstruct
the primitive-civilized binary by suggesting a continuity between the “savages” and “us”—one
that shows that “primitives” are not, after all, as remote from “us” as we were wont to think.
Yet seemingly fearful of the implications of his own statement, he no sooner suggests
these similarities than he takes them back, noting that any likenesses “may be no more than a
matter of externals” (26). Though he elsewhere attempts to locate a thorough kinship between
the modern “neurotic” and the “savage,” he nevertheless makes sure to note that “the differences between the situation of a savage and of a neurotic are no doubt of sufficient
importance to make any exact agreement impossible and to prevent our carrying the
comparison to the point of identity in every detail” (31). What Freud suggests here, in other
words, is that even while we might find certain similarities between savages and neurotics,
the savage must never be confused with the neurotic: true neurosis is, in short, something
reserved entirely for the “modern” and the “civilized.” It is the psychic consequence of
repression that, since “primitive men are . . . uninhibited,” they never really experience
(161). Freud’s and Park’s work is just one example of how psychological and
sociological texts cooperate to lend scientific credence to the notion that African
Americans—constructed as primitive and imagined since at least the time of George
Miller Beard as America’s native “savage,” the “bit of barbarism at our doorsteps”—are
shielded from neuroses (Beard 189).12 As I later suggest, Ellison’s representations of neurosis
in Invisible Man clearly engage with and revise these specious assumptions even as those
representations work to destabilize the traditional theoretical foundations of mental
illness.
Freud’s treatise also attempts to identify the source of neurosis, claiming that “the same
complex constitutes the nucleus of all neuroses,” namely the Oedipal
12

The cooperation of scientific discourses I suggest here is reinforced by Invisible Man’s Mary Rambo,
who, in an early draft of chapter 11, describes the authorities who have hospitalized the narrator as
“psychiatristses and a socialist or sociologist or something” (“Out” 248). Her conflation here is telling,
suggesting that psychiatrists, socialists, and sociologists are all about the same to her, at least insofar as
their attempts to subjectify, examine, and reprogram the narrator are concerned.
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complex (157). This complex, which he earlier defines as the “child’s relation to his parents,
dominated . . . by incestuous longings,” is for Freud the prime mover of all neuroses (17).
As Tate has observed, this is a problematic assumption because it “centers the individual’s
primary nurturing environment, not the external circumstances that precondition that
environment” (Psychoanalysis 16). In short, Freud pays scant attention here to the role that
material circumstances like poverty, racism, and oppression play in constituting neurosis,
an oversight that explicitly inspired the work of the LaFargue Clinic and that Ellison
addresses in Invisible Man.
By depicting primitives as unrepressed and naturally unable to experience the neuroses of
“civilization,” Freud and Park lend scientific credence to a primitivist discourse that
romanticized African Americans as fortunate, happy primitives. Of course, under the guise
of celebrating black as “better,” this romanticizing reinforces racist stereotypes by
denying African Americans a complex subjectivity and envisioning them as misfits of
modern culture. More ominously, as Ellison himself notes in “Richard Wright’s Blues,” this
tendency to “impute to Negroes sentiments, attitudes and insights which . . . [they] could
not humanly possess” may authorize and justify whites’ oppression of them: since society
assumes that “Negroes possess the richly human virtues credited to them, then their social
position is advantageous and should not be bettered; and, continuing syllogistically, the
white individual need feel no guilt over his participation in Negro oppression” (86). There
is, then, something profound at stake in Ellison’s depiction of insanity in Invisible Man.
Insofar as neuroses are equated with the modern, Ellison’s suggestion of a fundamental
relationship between black racial experience and neurosis will not only work to deactivate
the assumptions and prejudices I have been examining but will also stake a claim to modernity,
insisting that African Americans are indigenous products of (rather than out of place in)
modern civilization.
Madness Unmoored: Negotiable Neurosis and “Confusion” at the Golden Day
That the “neurotic features” of Ellison’s text have for so long been entirely overlooked or
dismissed as tangential to the novel’s supposedly more central aims seems implausible
when we consider that madness, after all, is with us from the beginning, when the narrator
recalls with a peculiar fondness his college years in the South:
Many times, here at night, I’ve closed my eyes and walked along the forbidden road
that winds past the girls’ dormitories, past the hall with the clock in the tower, its
windows warmly aglow . . . on down the road with its sloping and turning . . . on to
where the road became a bridge over a dry riverbed, tangled with brush and clinging vines; the bridge of rustic logs, made for trysting . . . on up the road, past the
buildings, with the southern verandas half-a-city-block long, to the sudden forking,
barren of buildings, birds, or grass, where the road turned off to the insane asylum.
(34–35)
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expansive verandas of the South, so too does insanity loom as an imminent and everpresent possibility in this novel. From the madness of the Golden Day to the melancholy of
young Emerson, the text overflows with the idioms and images of mental distress. From the
battle royal to the basement epilogue, the invisible man straddles a fine line between
sickness and sanity, and this, after all, would seem to be the import of his follow-up to the
passage above: “I always come this far and open my eyes” (35). “This far,” of course, is that
sudden but somehow not surprising fork in the road of his recollection where, always in the
distance, looms the asylum. As if unwilling to choose—or perhaps unwilling to confront a
choice that has already been made—he opens his eyes at precisely the point at which he must
accept or deny the road to insanity, and in this we find an apt figure for his central struggle in
this text. The significance of the passage above is twofold: it marks one of the earliest and
more subtle instances of the text’s preoccupation with mental matters, and it introduces
the fundamental but as yet ambiguous relationship between the narrator and neurosis. It may
also hint that if we want to understand anything about invisibility and identity in the text, we
must examine how it constructs and represents neurosis, and there is no richer example of
the text’s interest in this condition than the scene at the Golden Day.
Critics have celebrated Ellison’s study of madness at the Golden Day as the comic highlight of
the novel. Kerry McSweeney, for instance, labels the scene “a rollicking, madcap
comedy—a Marx Brothers—or Goon Show–type entertainment, in which the comedy team
is a group of mentally disturbed veterans who are masters of the put-on” (54). Yonka
Krasteva notes that the scene “recalls again the tradition of the carnival, with its frivolity and
. . . violence” (65), and William Lyne suggests that the events constitute the “richest and
funniest exchanges in the book” (327). Indeed, this scene is funny, and even the narrator, for
whom these events are most serious, “wanted to laugh.” But if we read this scene as only a
sort of comic relief, we risk overlooking the implications of the most sustained portrait of
neurosis in the novel. For the scene at the Golden Day in fact presents a kind of mental illness
extricated from the traditional psychiatric boundaries that normally control and circumscribe
its meaning. Figured dialectically and in terms that recall an almost Shakespearean
understanding of madness, neurosis here is both the terrible consequence of overwhelming
psychic stress and a liberating license to speak truth to and about power. It not only works
to challenge the primitivist assumption that blacks are somehow “shielded from neuroses”
but goes further to redefine the constitutive complex of neuroses as social rather than
familial.
It is fitting that the text introduces us to the mad veterans by way of a carceral metaphor:
“They straggled down the highway in a loose body . . . they looked like a chain gang on its
way to make a road” (71). As he does in the hospital scenes that appear elsewhere in the novel
(and that I examine later in this essay), Ellison here suggests a curious confusion of black
mental illness and criminality. The narrator’s observation of the mad vets as something like
a chain gang recalls for us his institutional experience after the explosion at the factory that
he repeatedly figures as not only prison-like but a reproduction of slavery itself. Certainly
beneath the humor of the events at the Golden Day—which itself was once, among other
things, a “jailhouse” —there is something more serious afoot (80).
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Despite the narrator’s initial suggestion that the madness at the Golden Day might all
just be a “game” or “joke,” it soon becomes apparent that the frivolity is only the thin
overlay of a tragedy lurking beneath (74, 158). Laughter turns too quickly to violence, and
the vets’ mad babble bears too many incisive commentaries to be taken lightly. These are
the “returning soldiers,” but hardly the sort that W. E. B. Du Bois envisioned as “Soldiers
of Democracy” who “return fighting” (“Returning” 5). Rather, they have come back
“shellshocked,” though Ellison’s representation of their neuroses suggests that their condition
has little to do with the war (73).
We might note, for instance, that little of what the mad vets say recalls the war or
suggests any sort of preoccupation with it. Of course, two characters stand out as
exceptions here—the “drum major” at the beginning of the scene who confuses Norton with
General Pershing and the man who insists that the “absolute Armistice” will “occur at
5:30” (72, 74). More often, though, the mad vets’ language alludes to matters closer to
home. Consider, for instance, the meeting between two of the vets and Norton:
“Look, Sylvester, it’s Thomas Jefferson!”
“I was just about to say, I’ve long wanted to discourse with him.” . . .
“Gentlemen, this man is my grandfather!”
“But he’s white, his name’s Norton.”
“I should know my own grandfather! He’s Thomas Jefferson and I’m his
grandson—on the ‘field-nigger’ side,” the tall man said.
“Sylvester, I do believe that you’re right. I certainly do,” he said, staring at Mr.
Norton. “Look at those features. Exactly like yours —from the identical mould.”

(77–78).
As Lyne observes of this exchange, “Our first impression is that these veterans are indeed
shell-shocked, speaking a language with significance only for them” (327). But underneath
the veteran’s apparently absurd claim is an incisive commentary on one of the more
infamous instances in the American history of miscegenation— a story vividly remembered
in popular lore but deliberately suppressed or downplayed in official histories and
biographies.13 The language of madness is thus a mode of social commentary that will later
become a mode of social protest when, at the height of excitement following their coup d’état,
the narrator observes the vets making “hostile speeches at the top of their voices against the
hospital, the state and the universe” (85). Clearly the vets have more on their neurotic minds
than the war, so one must look elsewhere to understand the etiology of their madness.
The brief personal histories of the vets offered by the narrator begin to indicate what the
source of their neuroses might be: “Many of the men had been doctors,
13

I refer here, of course, to the relationship between Thomas Jefferson and Sally Hemings, a story that
was not completely told or thoroughly examined until 1998, with the publication of Annette GordonReed’s Thomas Jefferson and Sally Hemings: An American Controversy. For more on the nature of and
motives for the suppression of this story throughout history, see GordonReed’s recently published followup, The Hemingses of Monticello: An American Family.
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lawyers, teachers, Civil Service workers; there were several cooks, a preacher, a politician,
and an artist. One very nutty one had been a psychiatrist” (74). This catalogue of
professions suggests that madness is largely a mark of the talented tenth, the black
professional class “toward which at various times [the narrator himself] vaguely aspired”
(74). We might conclude that the narrator’s aspirations— and, by implication, the goals and
promises of the black professional class—are brought into ironic relief: upward mobility is
figured as a futile and almost laughable journey toward insanity. I would suggest, however,
that what we find here is not so much an indictment of the black professional dream as an
exposure of the racist social practices that make the fulfillment of that dream impossible. Take,
for instance, the wise doctor-veteran’s explanation of how he ended up in an asylum:
I returned to save life and was refused. . . . Ten men in masks drove me out from the
city at midnight and beat me with whips for saving a human life. And I was forced to
the utmost degradation because I possessed skilled hands and the belief that my
knowledge could bring me dignity—not wealth, only dignity—and other men health!
(93)
It is not the vet’s dream or “belief” that is criticized or rendered absurd but the concrete
forces—the ten men in masks—that prevent him from realizing that dream. The passage
suggests that the locus of the problem is not in the vet’s naive aspirations but in the racist
social practices of the South. This is what makes him sick; the source of his neurosis is
rooted in his racial experience.
This vet is hardly an exception to the rule. We also have the example of Burn-side, a vet
whose paranoia has a similar root. When an anonymous voice explains, “They caught him
trying to change some blood into money,” Burnside screams, “I did too! . . . I discovered
it and John D. Rockefeller stole the formula from me” (81). The claim is absurd but the
implication is clear: his paranoia is rooted in a belief that rich whites are somehow
capitalizing on him—that they have “stolen” something from him. And we can be sure they
have, though it is something far more valuable than a formula to turn blood into money.14
Like the wise vet’s sickness described above, Burnside’s neurosis is informed by and rooted in
his racial experience, and his language, like the language of madness everywhere at the
Golden Day, is marked by a commentary on the particular experience of blacks in America.
What we find here, then, is that the neuroses Ellison represents at the Golden Day all
find their source in material circumstances, namely, the distinctive social conditions of
African American life at the time. Even the sole, sustained portrait of white neurosis in
this text seems to conform to this paradigm, suggesting that the psychic consequences
of these conditions may not be reserved for
14

The portrait of this vet recalls the insane scholar in Richard Wright’s Native Son who “was writing a book
on how colored people live and he says somebody stole all the facts he’d found” (343). Madness there too is
rooted in the character’s confrontation with the racist social dynamics of the United States.
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African Americans alone. Mr. Norton—who otherwise serves as a model of reasoned
living and enlightened giving—ends up at the Golden Day in a curious state of delirium
that one of the vets knowingly diagnoses as a “case of hysteria” (79). It is, of course, the
Trueblood incident that drives Norton to distress, but it is not, as others have argued,
because it dramatically confirms his own primitivist assumptions and desires. Rather, Norton
becomes “hysterical” because Trueblood exposes for him (as will the wise vet later at the
Golden Day) his own complicity in creating and perpetuating the myths of primitivism—a
considerable blow to one who earnestly considers the social progress of African Americans a
fundamental component of his own “destiny” and a telling suggestion that the unsettling of
primitivist assumptions we observe in this text has repercussions for the white psyche as
well (94).
In any case—indeed, it would seem in every case—Ellison redefines the constitutive
complex of neurosis as social, not familial, and in doing so revises Freud’s widely accepted
but substantially shortsighted notions. 15 Of course, in the very act of representing black
neurosis, Ellison challenges a discourse of primitivism that sought to construct blacks as
biologically invulnerable to mental illness. Challenging the assumption that blacks are
somehow “shielded . . . from neuroses,” Ellison suggests a fundamental, though certainly not
inevitable, connection between race and madness (qtd. in duCille 73).
Invisible Man thus demonstrates what Ellison claims elsewhere—that African Americans
are, after all, “full of the tensions of modern man” (Shadow 297) and suffer them more
acutely because their social conditions are more oppressive and their access to quality
treatment is largely denied. (Recall that “therapy” for the vets is a brothel and “treatment”
for the narrator is electroshock identity erasure, while someone like young Emerson, whose
“neurosis” is little more than bourgeois ennui, has his own “analyst” [185].) In doing so,
Ellison debunks the primitivist insistence that blacks have no interiority and claims for them a
complex, modern, American subjectivity.
Unusual Suspects: Sinister Shrinks, Blues Bars,
and Anti-psychiatric Animus in Invisible Man
If on one front we see Ellison disrupting psychiatry’s hold on the meaning of madness by
reimagining its etiology and possibilities, on another he much more directly confronts
psychiatry in its human and institutional forms: the psychiatrist and the psychiatric hospital.
By examining how Invisible Man represents these figures, we can better understand what
was at stake for Ellison in his literary rep15

As Eversley notes, Ellison and Wright were very much interested in “turning Freud upside down”—a
phrase borrowed from Wright’s essay on the LaFargue Clinic, “Psychiatry Comes to Harlem” (qtd. in
Eversley 445). However, I’m not convinced that an upside-down Freud is the best metaphor for what
Ellison accomplishes. Rather than simply reverse the order of the elements of Freud’s psychoanalytic
philosophy, Ellison presents a profoundly new interpretive paradigm for mental illness that had much in
common with the social psychiatry emerging at the time and embodied in practices of the clinic.
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resentations of madness and develop a fuller appreciation of the contours of his larger antipsychiatric project.
It is hardly a coincidence that Ellison begins his essay on Harlem life, “Harlem Is
Nowhere,” with a description of the LaFargue Psychiatric Clinic. Its singular presence as
the “sole mental clinic” (295) in a veritable city of neurosis testifies to the discriminatory
racial politics of psychiatry, while its rhetorically central position in the essay suggests that,
for Ellison, if one is to understand anything about “Negro life,” one must begin by
examining the psychological pressures that condition it. Indeed, Ellison was keenly
interested in matters of psychology and race, but while he may have been excited by the
possibilities of psychiatry in theory, he seems deeply suspicious of them in practice—at least
as we see them practiced in Invisible Man.
Ellison was certainly aware of and conversant with the myriad discourses that sought to
fix the meanings of neurosis in the first half of the twentieth century. He was particularly
familiar with and intrigued by Freud’s work, first encountering it at Tuskegee and then
continuing to study it assiduously on his own .16 As Ellison himself recalls, “I read quite a lot of
Freudian psychology, and my first job, a very temporary job, when I came to New York, was
to work with Dr. Harry Stack Sullivan. I was his receptionist for a few months, and I also
filed [and glanced through] case histories” (Graham and Singh 265). His interest in Freud is
also manifest in “Richard Wright’s Blues,” where he employs Freud’s work on dreams to
analyze and make sense of Black Boy’s protagonist (85). It would be a mistake, however, to
read Ellison’s employment of Freud as an outright validation of Freud’s thinking or of
psychoanalysis in general. Though useful enough as an interpretive framework in this
instance, Ellison elsewhere seems highly suspicious of psychological theories when
translated into the practical understanding and treatment of African American neurosis.
In both the novel itself and a wonderfully rich but generally unexamined version of
chapter 11 published separately as “Out of the Hospital and under the Bar,” Ellison critiques
psychiatry’s approach to black neurosis by attacking its institutional counterpart, the
mental hospital. Ellison’s portrait of the narrator at the factory hospital, for instance,
suggests a racist motive behind medical treatments of black mental illness. Though we have
no reason to suspect that the narrator would have anything more than physical injuries and a
bit of amnesia from the explosion in the factory basement, he is nonetheless being “cured”
of a supposed neurosis. As one of the doctors explains, they hope to “produce the results of
a prefrontal lobotomy without the negative effects of the knife” (Invisible 236). Clearly there is a
dangerous sort of experiment under way that, as another doctor suggests, would never occur
if the invisible man were a “New Englander with a Harvard background” (236). His
comment alludes to, and seems to take for granted, the racial politics that inform the
treatment of mental illness: the black mind is apparently useful as a site of psychological
experimentation but hardly worthy of a careful, proven cure.

16

For more on Ellison’s encounters with Freud,
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Of course, the “cure” they hope to effect here is not, after all, in the interest of the
patient but of society. In the language of medicine that Ellison parodies to the point of
absurdity, the overeager doctor explains:
You see, instead of severing the prefrontal lobe, a single lobe, that is, we apply pressure
in the proper degrees to the major centers of nerve control—our concept is Gestalt—
and the result is as complete a change of personality as you’ll find in your famous
fairy-tale cases of criminals transformed into amiable fellows after all that bloody

business of a brain operation. (236)
The curative function of medicine is curiously translated to a judicial one here, with the
object of treatment not to cure an illness but to convert a supposed criminal. These doctors
do not attempt to treat any neurosis the narrator might have but rather seek to engineer an
identity that will be more palatable and amenable to the expectations of white society. Certainly
the patient will no longer “experience [any] major conflict of motives,” but “even better” is the
fact that “society will suffer no traumata on his account” (236). It is a white fantasy of total
control, brilliant and effective because it is invisible—the result of strategically applied
“pressure” that leaves no marks; a quiet rather than a “bloody” sort of violence (236). The
electroshock “therapy” the narrator receives is not designed to make him “all better” but
literally to make him a “new man” (245), a project that deeply implicates psychiatry in the
racial fantasies of an increasingly paranoid America (73, 245).
This critique is even more refined in “Out of the Hospital and under the Bar,” which
Ellison ultimately excised from the novel for “considerations [of] space” (“Out” 243). As
Ellison explains in his headnote to the story, “For those who would care to fit it back into
Invisible Man let them start at the point where the explosion occurs in the paint factory,
substitute the following happenings, and leave them once the hero is living in Mary’s hope”
(243). This doesn’t quite work, however. Though this early version does follow the narrator
through his experiences in a hospital, it does not necessarily proceed from an explosion at a
factory. There is, in fact, no mention of an explosion or a factory anywhere in this version
(as there is in the novel), nor is the invisible man “checked out” through the factory office
as he is in the novel (Invisible 245–49). Instead the narrator in this early version recalls an
“illness in the street” and being “carried away in an ambulance” (“Out” 290). Presumably,
then, Ellison once had a nervous breakdown in mind for our narrator, and “Out of the
Hospital” is a study of what happens to him once he enters the hospital system.
While a few critics have remarked upon this earlier version of the chapter for its notable
elaboration of Mary’s character, 17 none has considered how this extended scene in a mental
hospital might indicate and bear upon Ellison’s interest in black neurosis and its treatment. I
would suggest that though this early version differs significantly from the final one in terms
of detail, its import is the same: we find
17

See, for instance, Tate’s “Notes on the Invisible Women in Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man.”
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here, but in bolder form, the same indictment of psychiatry we witness in the novel itself.
Notably, the hospital in this early version is much more clearly represented as a psychiatric
facility. The narrator is confined to an “iron straight-jacket” in a room where, in Mary’s
“unscientific” language, “psychiatristses and a socialist or sociologist or something [be]
looking at you all the time” (“Out” 247, 245, 248). He is connected to monitoring equipment
by electrodes that recall the shock “therapy” in the novel and is told that he is “ill, very
ill” right before an orderly attempts to put him in a straitjacket after he escapes (273). If
the straitjackets are not suggestive enough, the most compelling sign of the psychiatric
ward—the psychiatrist himself—appears during the narrator’s escape. As the narrator
roams the bowels of the hospital searching for a way out, he overhears an orderly ask,
“Why would he think of coming down here?,” to which the doctor replies, “Probably
some buried memory guided him. Perhaps this storage basement corresponds to the
structure of his mind” (275). The doctor’s ignorance of the obvious—that the basement is, in
fact, the only place the narrator could go—highlights the ridiculousness of his overly
analytical explanations. Ellison’s parody of psychoanalytic discourse reduces it to absurdity
and offers a direct, if somewhat amusing, criticism of psychiatry.
The narrator offers a significantly less amused indictment. For him, the brand of
psychiatry practiced at the hospital is not merely absurd but life-threatening: “I had to leave,
for I feared that now that I was becoming adjusted to this machine, they planned to place
me in one that was smaller—more severe. I’d probably be killed next time” (250). Indeed,
while Ellison does not clarify in this excerpt, as he does in the novel, the aim of the
hospital’s “cure,” we can be sure it is just as ominous. After all, Mary doesn’t merely
facilitate the narrator’s escape, she initiates it, indicating that while she might not know
exactly “[w]hy these white folks got [him] in this iron straight-jacket,” she knows injustice
when she sees it (247).18 The narrator will later clarify the nature of this injustice when,
during his escape, he screams:
You didn’t cure me, you took my energy. That’s it, you probably have a hospital full
of us, using our energy to run your stupid machinery! What do you care about my
name? How’d you get us in here, anyway? With a cold pork chop and a loaf of bread?
With a black snake whip, with handcuffs and a log chain? You see, I’m leaving, I’m
remembering. Lincoln freed the slaves . . . and I’m freeing me. (265)
While the narrator’s speech is certainly manic and erratic, it nonetheless levels a
serious indictment of the mental hospital’s motives for treating African Americans. Realizing that he is likely not a special case, the narrator imagines that the
18

Of course, it is possible that Mary knows more than she admits. It is curious that as soon as she enters
the narrator’s room (she evidently holds some sort of janitorial position at the hospital that allows her
unsupervised access), she begins to help him escape. She never states any motive and she never hesitates;
she simply begins to pry open the lid of the box that confines him.
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hospital is full of blacks like him, lured or forced into its confines. There is an echo of
the novel’s suggestion that blacks are used as guinea pigs to further the work of medical
science when the narrator claims that the hospital uses “our” energy to run its machinery.
Most important, though, is the narrator’s invocation of slavery, a gesture that seems to
imply that the mental hospital is little more than a reproduction of an old, familiar system,
with straitjackets replacing the chains and electrodes the whips. Cures are hardly the point:
as we later learn, the hospital is connected via an underground tunnel to (of all things) a
Harlem juke joint that the narrator must pass through to escape (277). The metaphor is richly
suggestive, and certainly one of its valences must be the implication that the cool blues of the
black bar offer a more valid and valuable “cure” than anything the hospital might have
effected.
In any case, what both versions of chapter 11 offer are consistently damning critiques of the
relationship between psychiatry and race. There is no LaFargue Psychiatric Clinic anywhere
in these pages “reject[ing] all stereotypes” and embracing each patient as a dynamic,
“modern” human being (“Harlem” 295). On the contrary, these scenes are laced with
primitivist assumptions and stereotypes that translate into malicious programs of social
engineering, and worse. These unique “treatments,” set aside particularly for blacks, are
symptomatic of the more widely held belief in a difference between black and white mental
illnesses—a belief the implications of which the novel works strenuously to expose and
debunk.
“Health in Division”: A Schizophrenic Solution?
If, for Ellison, psychiatry in its traditional forms offers little hope for (and poses a
formidable threat to) the treatment of black mental illness, and if clinics like LaFargue will
only ever exist as long as they are invisible, pushed underground, and dependent upon
private charity rather than public support, what kinds of options—what sorts of hopes—
remain? Ellison offers a most improbable answer to this question in the novel by
suggesting that “treatment” might not be the point at all. Instead of taking for granted the
static, immutable reality of mental illness and imagining a LaFargue-like form of “social
psychiatry” to treat it, Ellison ultimately seems to figure neurosis itself as highly
negotiable—as something that may act upon as well as be acted upon by the mentally ill.
The invisible man himself offers a compelling case in point, and by considering our narrator
as inescapably neurotic, I want to suggest a new way of understanding just exactly what he
has achieved when he says in the epilogue that he has “come a long way” (576).
That the narrator himself might be a portrait of neurosis is a possibility that critics
generally seem to ignore, deny, or dismiss.19 Yet I would argue that the nar19

Julia Eichelberger, for instance, reads Ellison’s novel as an “affirmation of ‘infinite possibilities’” but
does not consider whether or how the narrator’s neurosis might mitigate or otherwise condition his
achievement (57). Butler recognizes that the narrator was once on a track toward madness but suggests that
he escapes it in the end and no longer rides those “hard rails” that lead to the Golden Day (131). Eversley
allows that Invisible Man is a text interested in “neurosis” and even a kind of “schizophrenia,” but she
prefers to map both back onto the reader and
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rator’s central struggle in this text is his struggle with insanity. Throughout the novel—or at
least from the point he arrives in Harlem20—the narrator seems to be on the verge of
madness or, perhaps more accurately, of schizophrenia, with the “threat . . . [of] internal
discord” ever present (Invisible 335). He struggles to find “peace and quiet, tranquility” and
cries out at one point, “If only all the contradictory voices shouting inside my head would calm
down and sing a song in unison, whatever it was I wouldn’t care as long as they sang without
dissonance” (259). But in his quest to squelch this dissonance, he seems to sink only
deeper into it. The breaking point comes after he falls through the manhole at the end of his
narrative, where his conversation with his pursuers becomes something like a scene from
the Golden Day:
“What’s in the brief case?”
“You,” I said, suddenly laughing. “What do you think of that?”
“Me.”
“All of you,” I said.
“You’re crazy,” he said.
“But I still have you in this brief case!”
“What’d you steal?”
“Can’t you see?” I said. “Light a match.”
“What the hell’s he talking about, Joe?”
“Strike a match, the boogy’s nuts.”
...
“Ha! Ha! I’ve had you in my brief case all the time and you didn’t know me then
and can’t see me now.” (565–66)

We might speculate here that the narrator is strategically faking madness, and there would
certainly be precedent for such an imposture elsewhere in the novel. In the character Homer
A. Barbee’s tale of the Founder, we meet the “seemingly demented one” who uses his
“surprising knowledge” to help the Founder escape, all the while avoiding suspicion by
hiding behind the guise of insanity (a strategy also employed by the “granny” to deter the
pursuers) (122). Similarly, in Ellison’s earlier version of chapter 11, Mary thinks the narrator
is faking madness to “[make] a fool outa them doctors” (“Out” 248). Indeed, while such
instances certainly suggest the possibility that the narrator is feigning mental illness
strategically, the rest of the novel suggests a more compelling possibility.
Far from supporting the idea that he is faking it, the details in the prologue and
epilogue—the narrator’s revelation of himself in the present—only seem to confirm his
neurosis. At the beginning of his narrative, for instance, he admits
American culture more broadly, turning her (and our) attention away from the possibilities of a veritably
neurotic narrator (448, 460).
20

Several critics have observed a fundamental relationship between the city and neurosis, including Ellison
himself, who suggests in “Richard Wright’s Blues” that the urban North has profound implications for
the “psychosomatic structure” of blacks (88). On this point, see also Butler, Harper, Hana WirthNesher, and Richard Kostelanetz.
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that the very condition of invisibility is “wearing on the nerves,” and this no doubt contributes to
his abrupt and violent beating of the anonymous insulting stranger (Invisible 3). His actions
here suggest a more fundamental irrationality or “hysteria,” which is how the narrator
himself puts it at the end of the prologue (14).
The epilogue is even more telling. Here he speaks of a “sickness” and “conflict within”
(575, 581) and elsewhere of the “darkness” in “my own mind” (579). The contradictions and
dissonance that he once begged to escape—those symbols of the chaos and cacophony of
madness—he now embraces, recognizing “contradiction” as “[the way] the world moves”
and admitting that “ambivalence” is something with which he is well acquainted (6, 10). He
comes to accept the “contradictory voices,” an apt metaphor for the literal schizophrenia he
seems to affirm when he claims that “only in division is there true health” (259, 576). Yet we
do not really get the sense that he has regressed but rather, in his words, has “come a long
way” (576). What, then, is the nature of his apparent progress? To answer this question, we
must return briefly to the Golden Day.
In the exchange between Norton and the wise doctor-veteran, the latter suggests that
madness offers a curious mode of transcendence. Speaking of the mad veterans down below,
he says, “Such men are beyond money . . . they know nothing of value” (93). More than just
“outside history,” the veterans, by virtue of their madness, are outside economy and, in this
sense, escape the most fundamental (and most oppressive) force of social order. The
invisible man achieves something similar through his neurosis, marked as it is by his
embracing of contradiction and his affirmation of multiple voices.
As Georg Simmel notes in “The Metropolis and Mental Life,” the hallmark of modern
life is a “calculative exactness” that, like “the ideal of natural science,” seeks to
“transform the world into an arithmetic problem, to fix every part of the world by
mathematical formulas” (38). This urge to be exact is engendered by “the money economy”
that insists on “certainty in the definition of identities and difference” and
“unambiguousness” (37–38). To deny this urge is to submit to insanity, for only by guarding
against “discrepancies” and contradictions can the individual maintain his or her mental health
(37).
It is significant, then, that discrepancies and contradictions are precisely what the
invisible man refuses to guard against any longer. The epilogue is in fact a sustained
celebration of ambiguity and ambivalence, with the narrator announcing that he has
abandoned his struggle to escape dissonance and now embraces contradiction: “I denounce
and defend . . . I condemn and affirm, say no and say yes, say yes and say no . . . I hate and I
love” (Invisible 579–80; emphasis added). The invisible man thus refuses binary constructions
of the world that insist things must be one or the other, this or that; he avers instead that
things—that he—may be this and that. In doing so, he not only rejects the mandates of
economy and thus stands, like the vets at the Golden Day, “beyond money” but also
denies, by implication, a venerable prejudice, which, informed and underwritten by the
money economy, insists he cannot be both black and neurotic, both African and modern
(93).
The revelations and renunciations we witness underground in the epilogue seem even
to have implications for the most obstinate and unassailable dichotomy of all—the one that
insists upon the total and irrevocable divide between san-
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ity and insanity itself. To the men who are chasing the narrator at the end of the novel and
who stand topside on the surface, the narrator’s retreat underground appears to be a surefire
sign that “the boogy’s nuts” (566). Yet it is only ensconced in this subterranean space that
the narrator finds the means and the moxie to calmly assess and organize the events of
his life into the richly allusive, intricately elaborated narrative we have just read. Thus
what appears quite literally on the surface to be a kind of insanity may in fact be read, in
the supremely ironic spirit of the novel’s final pages, as a gesture toward reason, one that,
even if not fully consummated, nonetheless posits a sort of seamlessness between sanity and
insanity where before only hard lines existed. The narrator may not fully escape his
neurosis—as the vet explained to him long ago, mental illness is often the price to be
paid for what he ultimately achieves—but he does negotiate and, to some degree, mitigate
it by embracing it. Rather than struggle between the poles of a specious dichotomy, he
submits, and thereby finds an ironic sort of “health in division” —a kind of sanity in the
acceptance of the “contradictory voices . . . inside [his] head” (259).21
But if this qualified sanity amounts to any sort of “achievement,” it is a tenuous one at
best, and such an apparently neat wrapping up of a subject as exceedingly messy as madness
admittedly seems to leave the novel open to the kinds of charges that have been leveled
against it by those who insist that the text fails to follow through on any of its
“revolutionary” potential. Houston A. Baker, for instance, claims that the novel is “burdened
by belief, overwhelmed by excessive literary ‘smartness,’ [and] afraid to breathe life into its
potentially revolutionary cartoons” (6). For Baker, Ellison’s book is a political failure, and not
just because in general it neglects to realize and animate the radical energy of the black
masses, but because in particular (as Baker elsewhere suggests) it fails—and, in Baker’s terms,
fears— adequately to consider and “authentically” represent the importance of Southern
black consciousness in the process of civil rights revolution. Ellison’s representation of the
South is uninformed; his Southern images and characters are mere caricatures—perhaps
what one should expect from an Oklahoma-born “outsider.” As Baker concludes, “Ellison’s
black South, unfortunately, does not transcend the Carver Museum at Tuskegee” (6).22
The reading of madness I offer above would seem to lend a new kind of support to this
sort of argument, suggesting as it does that the final movement of the novel is inward—a
retreat—and that its ultimate “solution” is a frustratingly playful,
21
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There may seem to be a potentially problematic irony in suggesting that the narrator ultimately embraces a
kind of schizophrenia, given that Ellison once described his fellow Americans as “schizophrenics” for their
unwillingness to resolve the conflict between their ideals of democracy and the practice of segregation
(Eversley 447). Considered in this light, the schizophrenic “solution” I propose we see at the end of the
novel would seem uncomfortably to align the narrator with a tradition of deflection and deferral. As I go on
to argue, however, Ellison reconceives schizophrenia as a powerful precondition for meaningful action.
While I think we may very well see the South as a source of anxiety in this novel, I am not convinced
that Ellison’s South can be reduced to mere spectacle, nor do I think he entirely fails to register its
importance, if not in the struggle for revolution then at least in the struggle for self-realization, which is
for Ellison the precondition of any collective realization.
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even if prescient, deconstruction of neurosis that authorizes and encourages the narrator’s
“hibernation.” Read in this light, the narrator’s final embrace of dissonance would be less a
radical triumph than a stubborn unwillingness to choose a side and fight for it; it would
amount to what Jerry Gaffo Watts has elsewhere identified as the invisible man’s
psychological emigration from the burdens of a politically engaged existence; it would
indeed appear to leave us with a narrator who amounts to little more than a postmodern
“cartoon” of a neurotic (an example, no doubt, of Ellison’s “excessive literary ‘smartness’”).
It seems to me, though, that such readings work only by way of a stubborn pessimism that
is, more seriously, the product of a highly selective reading of the text. For the invisible
man’s final gesture in the novel is not toward disengagement, retreat, and stasis but toward
a cryptically articulated but nonetheless inevitable “next phase” (Invisible 576). He affirms
repeatedly that the “hibernation is over” (580) and that he is “coming out” (581)—a move
that is available to the narrator not in spite of but precisely because of the insight and
inspiration he gains from his deliberate acceptance of what he variously refers to as
“division,” “dissonance,” and “diversity.” This is the “decision [that] has been made” (581)
that the invisible man so obscurely refers to before signing off and “coming out”—it is not a
final, comprehensive solution but a productive, creative, and enabling compromise that allows
the narrator to imagine and pursue that “next phase.”
And it is perhaps no coincidence, after all, that the narrator hints that his next move will
likely be south: his “passion to return into that ‘heart of darkness’ across the Mason-Dixon
line” may very well be motivated not only by a desire to return to the site where his own
story began but to seek a sort of cure for his “sickness” in what has often been imagined
as the supreme geographical locus of sanity: the American South (579, 575). Such a turn
would affirm the South as a vital and restorative part of the nation, especially for those who
might have, as Mary warned they would, let too much of Harlem get in them .23
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